Internet Encryption Algols are flawed- too little too late!

Some news from a paper I am reading- not surprised that RSA has a problem .

http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/064.pdf

Abstract. We performed a sanity check of public keys collected on the web. Our main goal was to test the validity of the assumption that di erent random choices are made each time keys are generated.We found that the vast majority of public keys work as intended. A more disconcerting fi nding is that two out of every one thousand RSA moduli that we collected off er no security.

 

Our conclusion is that the validity of the assumption is questionable and that generating keys in the real world for multiple-secrets” cryptosystems such as RSA is signi cantly riskier than for single-secret” ones such as ElGamal or (EC)DSA which are based on Die-Hellman.

Keywords: Sanity check, RSA, 99.8% security, ElGamal, DSA, ECDSA, (batch) factoring, discrete logarithm, Euclidean algorithm, seeding random number generators, K9.

and

 

99.8% Security. More seriously, we stumbled upon 12720 di erent 1024-bit RSA moduli that o ffer no security. Their secret keys are accessible to anyone who takes the trouble to redo our work. Assuming access to the public key collection, this is straightforward compared to more

traditional ways to retrieve RSA secret keys (cf. [5,15]). Information on the a ected X.509 certi cates and PGP keys is given in the full version of this paper, cf. below. Overall, over the data we collected 1024-bit RSA provides 99.8% security at best (but see Appendix A).

 

However no algol is perfect and even Elliptic Based Crypto ( see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_cryptography#Fast_reduction_.28NIST_curves.29 )has a flaw called Shor http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shor%27s_algorithm

Funny thing is ECC is now used for Open DNS

http://dnscurve.org/crypto.html

The DNSCurve project adds link-level public-key protection to DNS packets. This page discusses the cryptographic tools used in DNSCurve.

ELLIPTIC-CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY

DNSCurve uses elliptic-curve cryptography, not RSA.

RSA is somewhat older than elliptic-curve cryptography: RSA was introduced in 1977, while elliptic-curve cryptography was introduced in 1985. However, RSA has shown many more weaknesses than elliptic-curve cryptography. RSA’s effective security level was dramatically reduced by the linear sieve in the late 1970s, by the quadratic sieve and ECM in the 1980s, and by the number-field sieve in the 1990s. For comparison, a few attacks have been developed against some rare elliptic curves having special algebraic structures, and the amount of computer power available to attackers has predictably increased, but typical elliptic curves require just as much computer power to break today as they required twenty years ago.

IEEE P1363 standardized elliptic-curve cryptography in the late 1990s, including a stringent list of security criteria for elliptic curves. NIST used the IEEE P1363 criteria to select fifteen specific elliptic curves at five different security levels. In 2005, NSA issued a new “Suite B” standard, recommending the NIST elliptic curves (at two specific security levels) for all public-key cryptography and withdrawing previous recommendations of RSA.

Some specific types of elliptic-curve cryptography are patented, but DNSCurve does not use any of those types of elliptic-curve cryptography.

No wonder college kids are hacking defense databases easily nowadays!!

Analytics for Cyber Conflict -Part Deux

Part 1 in this series is avaiable at http://www.decisionstats.com/analytics-for-cyber-conflict/

The next articles in this series will cover-

  1. the kind of algorithms that are currently or being proposed for cyber conflict, as well as or detection

Cyber Conflict requires some basic elements of the following broad disciplines within Computer and Information Science (besides the obvious disciplines of heterogeneous database types for different kinds of data) –

1) Cryptography – particularly a cryptographic  hash function that maximizes cost and time of the enemy trying to break it.

From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_hash_function

The ideal cryptographic hash function has four main or significant properties:

  • it is easy (but not necessarily quick) to compute the hash value for any given message
  • it is infeasible to generate a message that has a given hash
  • it is infeasible to modify a message without changing the hash
  • it is infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash

A commercial spin off is to use this to anonymized all customer data stored in any database, such that no database (or data table) that is breached contains personally identifiable information. For example anonymizing the IP Addresses and DNS records with a mashup  (embedded by default within all browsers) of Tor and MafiaaFire extensions can help create better information privacy on the internet.

This can also help in creating better encryption between Instant Messengers in Communication

2) Data Disaster Planning for Data Storage (but also simulations for breaches)- including using cloud computing, time sharing, or RAID for backing up data. Planning and creating an annual (?) exercise for a simulated cyber breach of confidential just like a cyber audit- similar to an annual accounting audit

3) Basic Data Reduction Algorithms for visualizing large amounts of information. This can include

  1. K Means Clustering, http://www.jstor.org/pss/2346830 , http://www.cs.ust.hk/~qyang/Teaching/537/Papers/huang98extensions.pdf , and http://stackoverflow.com/questions/6372397/k-means-with-really-large-matrix
  2. Topic Models (LDA) http://www.decisionstats.com/topic-models/,
  3. Social Network Analysis http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_network_analysis,
  4. Graph Analysis http://micans.org/mcl/ and http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19407357
  5. MapReduce and Parallelization algorithms for computational boosting http://www.slideshare.net/marin_dimitrov/large-scale-data-analysis-with-mapreduce-part-i

In the next article we will examine

  1. the role of non state agents as well as state agents competing and cooperating,
  2. and what precautions can knowledge discovery in databases practitioners employ to avoid breaches of security, ethics, and regulation.

Using Opera Unite to defeat SOPA?

Lets assume that the big bad world of American electoral politics forces some kind of modified SOPA to be passed, and the big American companies have to abide by that law (just as they do share data  for National Security under Patriot Act but quitely).

I belive Opera Unite is the way forward to sharing content on the Internet.

From-

http://dev.opera.com/articles/view/opera-unite-developer-primer-revisited/

Opera Unite features a Web server running inside the Opera browser, which allows you to do some amazing things. At the touch of a button, you can share images, documents, video, music, games, collaborative applications and all manner of other things with your friends and colleagues

I can share music, and files , and the web server is actually my own laptop. try beating 2 billion new web servers that sprout!! File system sharing is totally secure- you can create private, public, or password protected files, a messaging system that can be used for drop messages (called fridge), a secure messaging system and your own web server is ready to start at a click. the open web may just use opera instead of chromium, and US regulation would be solely to blame. even URL blocking is of limited appeal thanks to software like MafiaWire Extension

Throw in Ad block, embedded bit torrent sharing and some more  Tor level encryption within the browser and sorry Senator, but the internet belongs to the planet not to your lobbyist.

see-http://dev.opera.com/web